

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 07
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USSCC GENEVA 3320

EXDIS/SCC

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDSI
TAGS: PARM
SUBJ: COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL'S SCC STATEMENT

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT MADE BY COMMISSIONER
GRAYBEAL AT FIFTH AND FINAL MEETING OF THE FIRST SESSION OF
THE SCC, JULY 5, 1973.

STATEMENT BY COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL
AT THE FIFTH MEETING OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SCC
JULY 5, 1973

MR. COMMISSIONER,

I.

THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THIS FIFTH AND FINAL MEETING OF THE FIRST
SESSION OF THE SCC IS TO RECEIVE THE JOINT DRAFT TEXTS PREPARED BY
THE WORKING GROUP AD REFERENDUM TO SCC COMMISSIONERS FOR THEIR
CONSIDERATION. IN ADDITION, WE SHOULD ALSO AGREE ON THE TIMING OF
AND AGENDA FOR OUR NEXT SCC SESSION.

(BRACKET) COL. FITZGERALD'S WORKING GROUP REPORT (BRACKET)
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THE JOINT DRAFT TEXTS WE HAVE RECEIVED FOR CONSIDERATION BY
THE COMMISSIONERS REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT AND USEFUL STEP TOWARDS
REACHING THE MUTUALLY AGREED PROCEDURES CALLED FOR BY THE ABM
TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND ITS PROTOCOL. IWOULD LIKE TO

PERSONALLY COMMEND THE WORKING GROUP ON ITS PROGRESS TOWARDS THIS GOAL. THEY ACCOMPLISHED THEIR PURPOSE BY PRODUCING DOCUMENTS IN WHICH THE SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE US AND SOVIET VIEWS ARE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED. IT IS PRECISELY THESE DIFFERENCES ON WHICH YOU AND I, AND OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS, MUST FOCUS OUR ATTENTION BETWEEN NOW AND THE NEXT SCC SESSION.

IT IS ALSO EVIDENT FROM THE RESULTS OF THE WORKING GROUP THAT MORE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN FORMULATING PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS THAN FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS. THE US SIDE AGREED TO FOCUS OUR ATTENTION INITIALLY ON THE PROTOCOL AND PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS; THIS WAS IN RECOGNITION OF THE TIME URGENCY OF CERTAIN OF THESE PROCEDURES AS THE IMPORTANCE MY GOVERNMENT ATTACHES TO THE EARLY COMPLETION OF THE MUTUALLY AGREED PROCEDURES CALLED FOR BY BOTH THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROTOCOL AND PROCEDURES FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS SHOULD COME INTO FORCE AT THE SAME TIME AS THE PROTOCOL AND PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. CONSEQUENTLY, I URGE THE SOVIET SIDE TO GIVE CAREFUL ATTENTION TO THE US PROPOSED PROCEDURES FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS, SO THAT EARLY IN THE NEXT SESSION OF THE SCC WE WILL BE ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON, AND BRING INTO FORCE, THE MUTUALLY AGREED PROCEDURES CALLED FOR BY THE ABM TREATY AND BY THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND ITS PROTOCOL.

I.

ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN A THOROUGH EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES REFLECTED IN THE JOINT DRAFT TEXTS WE HAVE RECEIVED TODAY, I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE SOME ADDITIONAL COMMENTS, WHICH I HOPE WILL FACILITATE THE REVIEW AND STUDY WE WILL BE MAKING BETWEEN NOW AND OUR NEXT SESSION.

I BELIEVE THAT BOTH SIDES ARE ANXIOUS TO ACHIEVE PROCEDURES WHICH ARE NOT ONLY COMPATIBLE WITH THE INTENT OF THE ABM TREATY
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AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, BUT WHICH WILL ALSO ENHANCE THE VIABILITY OF THESE AGREEMENTS. IN THIS CONNECTION, BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT THERE SHOULD BE TIMELY NOTIFICATION AND THAT PROCEDURES FOR SUCH NOTIFICATION SHOULD BE WORKED OUT IN THE SCC. HOWEVER, THERE IS A CLEAR DIFFERENCE OF OPINION AS TO WHAT CONSTITUTES "TIMELY NOTIFICATION." THE US SIDE HAS PROPOSED PROCEDURES INCORPORATING NOTIFICATION BOTH PRIOR TO AND AFTER REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION HAS OCCURRED. THE SOVIET SIDE ON THE OTHER HAND HAS PROPOSED NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES ONLY AFTER SUCH ACTIVITIES. IN OUR OPINION, THE SOVIET APPROACH IS NOT ADEQUATE FOR MEANINGFUL PROCEDURES. WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH PROCEDURES SHOULD INCLUDE NOTIFICATION BEFORE DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION ACTIONS BEGIN.

WE BELIEVE THAT ANY REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION PROCEDURES SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO MINIMIZE THE POSSIBILITY OF

UNCERTAINTIES AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS. THE NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES PROPOSED BY THE US SIDE ARE BASED ON THIS CONCEPT. WE BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE REASONABLE, THAT THEY WOULD PROMOTE HIGH CONFIDENCE IN VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, AND THAT BY REDUCING UNCERTAINTIES AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS THEY WOULD ENHANCE THE VIABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS TO WHICH THEY APPLY. OUR SUCCESS IN WORKING OUT IN A TIMELY FASHION THE PROCEDURES CALLED FOR BY THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WILL HAVE A POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON OUR OWN FUTURE WORK IN THE SCC, AS WELL AS ON THE GENERAL ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS ON MORE COMPREHENSIVE AND COMPLEX STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS--BOTH OF WHICH WOULD FURTHER CONTRIBUTE TO THE CONTINUED IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

AMONG THE GENERAL GUIDELINES INCLUDED IN THE JOINT DRAFT

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TEXT WE HAVE RECEIVED FOR CONSIDERATION THERE IS A GUIDELINE WHICH DEALS WITH THE NUMBER OF REPLACEMENT BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES WHICH ARE UNDER CONSTRUCTION SIMULTANEOUSLY. THIS GUIDELINE AND THE ASSOCIATED SPECIFIC PROCEDURE PROPOSING A LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF SSBNs WHICH HAVE BEEN LAUNCHED BUT HAVE NOT YET BEGUN SEA TRIALS WERE PROPOSED BY THE US SIDE TO MEET POSSIBLE CONCERNs THAT, WITHIN THE LIMITS ALLOWED BY THE PROTOCOL TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, ONE SIDE MIGHT HAVE UNDER CONSTRUCTION SIMULTANEOUSLY A NUMBER OF BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES WHICH EXCEEDS A NORMAL

SCHEDULE FOR CONSTRUCTION OF REPLACEMENT SUBMARINES. SUCH AN ACTION BY EITHER SIDE WOULD CERTAINLY GENERATE SERIOUS CONCERNs REGARDING THE VIABILITY OF THE CURRENT AGREEMENT AND COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT FUTURE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS. THEREFORE, I

BELIEVE THAT THIS GUIDELINE ACCCOMPANIED BY A SPECIFIC PROCEDURE WHICH PLACES SOME LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF SSBNS WHICH HAVE BEEN LAUNCHED BUT HAVE NOT YET BEGUN SEA TRIALS IS IMPORTANT TO OUR GOAL OF ACHIEVING PROCEDURES WHICH ARE NOT ONLY COMPATIBLE WITH THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND ITS PROTOCOL BUT ALSO ENHANCE CONFIDENCE IN THESE AND FUTURE AGREEMENTS.

THERE IS COMPLETE AGREEMENT THAT THE DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF ICBM LAUNCHERS AND SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC

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MISSILE LAUNCHERS SHALL ENSURE THAT THE LAUNCHERS AND ASSOCIATED FACILITIES WOULD BE PUT IN A CONDITION THAT PRECLUDES THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR USE FOR LAUNCHING ICBMs OR SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES, RESPECTIVELY. THE US SIDE BELIEVES THAT THE MANNER IN WHICH SUCH DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION IS ACCOMPLISHED SHOULD RESULT IN CLEAR ASSURANCE THAT REPLACED ICBM FACILITIES HAVE IN FACT BEEN DEACTIVATED, AND ALSO ENSURE THAT THE REACTIVATION TIME OF SUCH FACILITIES WOULD NOT BE SUBSTANTIALLY LESS THAN THE TIME REQUIRED FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION. IN MY OPINION, THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT THIS REFLECTS A FUNDAMENTAL INTENT BEHIND THE PROCEDURES CALLED FOR BY THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. CONSEQUENTLY, I URGE THE SOVIET SIDE TO GIVE FURTHER STUDY TO THE SPECIFIC PROCEDURES PROPOSED BY THE US SIDE WITH THIS CONCEPT IN MIND.

III.

MR. COMMISSIONER, BASED UPON OUR EARLIER EXHCANGES, I PROPOSE THAT THE NEXT SESSION OF THE SCC BE CONVENED IN GENEVA CONCURRENT WITH THE RESUMPTION OF THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS UNLESS THOSE NEGOTIATIONS ARE RESUMED BEFORE SEPTEMBER OR VERY LATE THIS YEAR, IN WHICH CASE I PROPOSE THAT THE TIMING OF THE SECOND SESSION BE ESTABLISHED THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. I BELIEVE THAT SEPTEMBER, 1973, WOULD BE THE MOST DESIRABLE DATE.

I PROPOSE THAT THE AGENDA FOR THE SECOND SESSION OF THE SCC INCLUDE THE COMPLETION AND BRINGING INTO FORCE OF THE AGREED PROCEDURES CALLED FOR BY THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND ITS PROTOCOL. ANY OTHER MATTER WITHIN THE COMPETENCE OF THE SCC MAY BE RAISED AT THIS MEETING; IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 3 OF OUR REGULATIONS THE COMMISSIONERS SHOULD IF POSSIBLE INFORM EACH OTHER IN ADVANCE OF SUCH MATTERS.

IV.

MR. COMMISSIONER, IN SUMMARY, I BELIEVE THAT THE RESULTS OF THIS FIRST SESSION INDICATE THAT THE SCC IS OFF TO A GOOD START. SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN THE WORKING GROUP AND IN OUR FIVE SCC MEETINGS. MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE; HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT BY CONTINUING FRANK AND BUSINESSLIKE EXCHANGES AT ALL LEVELS, WE WILL ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVE AND THE SCC WILL BE ANOTHER IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE CONSTANTLY IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO

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GOVERNMENTS.

GRAYBEAL

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